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It is not often mentioned that Kant has a place in his moral philosophy for a particular 
kind of satisfaction associated with being a virtuous person. As he claims in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant believes there is a special word for the kind of “satisfaction with one’s 
existence … that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue”, namely “self-
contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit]” (KpV AA 05:117.25-28, translation modified).1 That virtuous 
action is accompanied by this feeling of satisfaction could be problematic, however, because one 
might object that virtuous action is only performed in order to experience the feeling of 
satisfaction that results from so acting. Kant was aware of this objection and did not think that 
his conception of self-contentment was vulnerable to it. In general, however, what exactly Kant’s 
conception of self-contentment amounts to is unclear and the limited secondary literature 
disagrees about its meaning and significance. My primary aim in this paper is thus to clarify 
Kant’s conception of self-contentment. I do so by placing the term in the context of Kant’s 
answer to the above-mentioned objection, which was made by Kant’s contemporary Christian 
Garve. I begin by illustrating the main features of Kant’s concept of self-contentment before 
turning to Garve’s objection and Kant’s response to it. I conclude by clarifying the differences 




Kant explicitly describes self-contentment as “a state of contentment and peace of soul in 
which virtue is its own reward” which occurs “[w]hen a thoughtful human being has overcome 
incentives to vice and is aware of having done his often bitter duty” (MS AA 06:377.20-22). As 
																																																								
1 Where available, all English translations of Kant’s works use The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. All other translations are my own. 
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mentioned, he also claims it is “a word that does not denote enjoyment, as the word happiness 
does, but that nevertheless indicates a satisfaction with one’s existence, an analogue of happiness 
that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue” (KpV AA 05:117.25-28). Kant 
clarifies the way in which self-contentment is different from happiness in his lectures on religion: 
Pleasure with one’s condition is called well-being, and insofar as this pleasure relates to the 
whole of our existence it is called happiness. […] The pleasure with one’s own person is called 
self-contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit]. What is characteristic of us is what freedom consists of. 
As a result, the pleasure with one’s freedom or with the quality of one’s will is self-contentment. 
If this self-contentment reaches over our entire existence, then it is called bliss [Seligkeit]. (V-
Th/Volckmann AA 28:1191.7-16) 
As this quotation makes clear, while happiness has to do with pleasure and well-being, self-
contentment relates to the quality of our own person, i.e. our will and the extent to which we 
exercise freedom and our satisfaction with ourselves in this respect. 
 The distinction between contentment and happiness can be further clarified if we look 
closer at how the exercise of freedom is related to contentment. Kant clarifies this link in the 
second Critique when he claims: 
[f]reedom, and the consciousness of freedom as an ability to follow the moral law with an 
unyielding disposition, is independence from the inclinations […] and so far as I am conscious of 
this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the sole source of an unchangeable contentment 
[…] and this can be called intellectual contentment. (KpV AA 05:117-8.31-01)  
Kant goes on to distinguish intellectual from “aesthetic” contentment, namely the satisfaction of 
the inclinations. In fact, he claims that contentment is not the right term to use in the latter case 
because “the inclinations change, grow with the indulgence one allows them, and always leave 
behind a still greater void than one had thought to fill. Hence they are always burdensome to a 
rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of 
them” (KpV AA 05:118.4-9). This is significant, for it is due to the fact that the inclinations are 
burdensome that we can understand 
how consciousness of this ability of a pure practical reason [freedom – M.W.] through a deed 
(virtue) can in fact produce consciousness of mastery over one’s inclinations, hence of 
independence from them and so too from the discontent that always accompanies them, and thus 
can produce a negative satisfaction with one’s state, that is, contentment, which in its source is 
contentment with one’s person. (KpV AA 05:118.24-30) 
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Indeed, the link between freedom and self-contentment lies in the connection between freedom 
and independence of the inclinations. Acting freely and independently of the pull of the 
inclinations means being free from the burden of the inclinations. This results in what Kant calls 
a “negative satisfaction”, i.e. a kind of satisfaction consisting in the absence of something painful 
or unsatisfying. Once one masters one’s inclinations, one can be “content with oneself”, i.e. one 
can be satisfied with oneself as having removed the burden and influence of the inclinations. 
With this in hand it also becomes clear how Kant distinguishes happiness, on the one hand, and 
self-contentment, on the other, from bliss [Seligkeit]. Shortly after the above quoted passage 
from Religionsphilosophie Volckmann, Kant claims that  
[s]elf-contentment is created from morality, as opposed to happiness depending on physical 
conditions. No creature has the natural forces in its control such that it can make them coincide 
with its self-contentment. One would therefore never ascribe to a creature the highest level of 
self-contentment or with other words bliss [Seligkeit]. (V-Th/Volckmann AA 28:1191.24-30)  
Only complete independence from the inclinations can result in bliss, meaning this is something 
unachievable in this life by human beings, given we are both rational and sensible. Although we 
cannot achieve bliss as rational and sensible beings, we can achieve both happiness and the 
imperfect version of bliss, namely self-contentment. 
We have now seen how self-contentment is both analogous to happiness but is also not 
equivalent to happiness itself. Self-contentment is perhaps the closest thing to bliss or complete 
independence from the inclinations that human beings can experience. Self-contentment itself, 
however, is not so easily attained either. As Kant claims in the second Critique: 
one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the 
immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his own eyes, in order to feel that 
satisfaction in consciousness of one’s conformity with it and bitter remorse if one can reproach 
oneself with having transgressed it. (KpV AA 05:38.24-29)  
In other words, self-contentment is not something experienced along with the performance of 
every virtuous action, rather it is only experienced once one has achieved or acquired the 
virtuous disposition. This will be important once we turn to Kant’s answer to Garve’s objection. 
Before turning to Garve, however, it is important clarify when exactly one experiences the 
satisfaction of self-contentment if not after performing a virtuous action, and also how one goes 
about attaining it.  
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Kant states that for those who are not yet virtuous, “I certainly do not deny that frequent 
practice in conformity with this determining ground can finally produce subjectively a feeling of 
satisfaction with oneself” (KpV AA 05:38.34-36). As stated in a previous quotation, self-
contentment can only be experienced once one already values the authority of the moral law. In 
other words, one must already possess the virtuous disposition or be a virtuous person to 
experience self-contentment. This means that self-contentment can only be experienced from a 
condition that one has to acquire, namely the virtuous disposition. Only after many attempts of 
trying one’s best, and therefore perhaps very late in life, is one capable of feeling “content with 
oneself” and experiencing the satisfaction of having attempted to be as virtuous as possible. 
Indeed, given Kant’s thesis that we can never know our true motives (see e.g. GMS AA 
04:407.01-4), being content with oneself is not a matter of knowing one is a virtuous person and 
has without a doubt acted virtuously, rather it is a matter of knowing that one has tried one’s best 
to be motivated by duty alone and only when one has become the kind of person who has and 
does try their best to be so motivated does one experience self-contentment.  
Now that we have an at least cursory understanding of Kant’s conception of self-
contentment, we can turn to an important objection raised by Christian Garve, an objection wo 
which Kant is vulnerable as a result of positing the existence of a certain kind of satisfaction 
associated with being virtuous. As I will show, however, Kant’s understanding of self-
contentment avoids the issue raised by Garve in a relatively satisfying way.  
 
2. Garve’s Objection and Kant’s Response 
 
In his Essays on Various Topics from Morality, Literature and Social Life [Versuche über 
verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Literatur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben], 
Christian Garve claims that according to the principles of some philosophers “the virtuous 
individual […] ceaselessly strives to be worthy of happiness, but – insofar as he is truly virtuous 
– never strives to be happy” (Garve 1792, 111-112).2 It is clear, of course, that Garve has Kant in 
mind. At the time of the publication of Garve’s book (1792), Kant had published both the 
Groundwork (1785) and the second Critique (1788), both of which identify acting morally with 
striving to be worthy of happiness (see e.g. AA GMS 04:393.16-24 and KpV AA 05:110.27-28). 
																																																								
2 All translations of Garve are my own. 
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Garve criticizes the idea of separating the striving to be worthy of happiness from the desire for 
happiness itself when he famously claimed:  
For my part I confess that I grasp this division of ideas very well with my head, but I do not find 
this division of desires and strivings in my heart; - that it is even inconceivable to me how any 
person can become aware that his longing to be worthy of happiness is purely separated from the 
longing for happiness itself – and has therefore performed his duty entirely disinterestedly. 
(Garve 1792, 112) 
To be clear, Garve’s claim is that it is impossible for anyone to distinguish between these two 
kinds of desires in themselves. Implied by this, however, is that the desire to be worthy of 
happiness might just be reducible to the desire for happiness. Kant responds to this objection by 
distinguishing between two types of pleasure. 
In two texts written after the publication of Garve’s book, namely the article On a 
recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy (1796) and the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797), Kant distinguishes between “pathological pleasure and moral pleasure” (MS AA 
06:378.09). According to Kant, “[p]leasure that must precede one’s observance of the law in 
order for one to act in conformity with the law is pathological […] but pleasure that must be 
preceded by the law in order to be felt is in the moral order” (MS AA 06:378.10-14). On the one 
hand there are the pathological pleasures, the expectation of which can act as a motive to action.3 
On the other hand, there is a certain kind of pleasure that only results from acting in accordance 
with the moral law. This latter pleasure is what Kant calls moral pleasure and it is this concept 
that plays a central role in Kant’s response to Garve. 
At the points where Kant discusses moral pleasure he mentions the position of a certain 
“eudaemonist” (see VT AA 8:395n and MS AA 6:377.23), who believes that “the pleasure 
(contentment) that a righteous man has in view, in order to feel it one day in the consciousness of 
his well-conducted course of life (and thus the prospect of his future felicity), is in fact the true 
motive for conducting his affairs well (in accordance with the law)”  (VT AA 08:395.note). 
According to the eudaemonist, then, because the righteous man experiences satisfaction with his 
well-conducted course of life, this satisfaction and not the striving to be worthy of happiness 
might be the true motive of the righteous man’s “virtuous” actions. Given the similarity between 
																																																								
3 To be clear, we do not necessarily need to experience pleasure in order for us to desire something, according to 
Kant. Kant’s distinction between instinct and inclination is meant to capture precisely this point: an inclination 
“presupposes acquaintance with the object of desire” (RGV AA 06:29.n) whereas an instinct does not (see also 
Johnson 52 and Höwing 3f.). 
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this position and Garve’s objection, it is likely that Kant has Garve in mind here. Indeed, Kant 
was perhaps worried about Garve’s objection because it was first in the second Kritik that Kant 
discussed the satisfaction associated with virtue. This satisfaction, of course, is self-contentment, 
i.e. “a satisfaction with one’s existence […] that must necessarily accompany consciousness of 
virtue” (KpV AA 05:117.25-28). In that Kant had such a concept, Kant would have felt the need 
to respond to Garve’s objection explicitly.  
Kant’s response to the eudaemonist’s objection amounts to the claim that the 
eudaemonist is reasoning circularly and that the objection is meaningless. In the Tone essay, for 
example, Kant claims the following: 
since I must assume him [the righteous person – M.W.] beforehand to be righteous and obedient 
to the law, i.e., to be one in whom the law precedes the pleasure, in order for him subsequently to 
feel a pleasure of the soul in the consciousness of his well-conducted course of life, it is an empty 
circle in the reasoning to make the pleasure, which is a consequence, into the cause of that course 
of life. (VT AA 08:395.note) 
Based on his distinction between pathological and moral pleasure, then, Kant argues it is in fact 
impossible for moral pleasure to somehow be the true motive of our strivings to be worthy of 
happiness. This is the case because it is only when we are already virtuous and motivated by the 
moral law alone that it is possible for us to experience moral pleasure in the first place. To desire 
to be virtuous only for the sake of the pleasure that results from having a pure moral motive is 
precisely not to have the moral motive – it is to be motivated by the desire for pleasure. Indeed, 
given the nature of moral pleasure it is simply a logical mistake to think one can experience 
moral pleasure in this way. As a moral pleasure, this is how Kant’s conception of self-
contentment removes the threat of Garve’s objection. Not only this, but insofar as self-
contentment is a kind of satisfaction one can only experience from a state that one has to acquire, 
it would not make sense to expect to experience this satisfaction if one did no yet have the 
virtuous disposition (which one certainly does not have if one’s motive for acting virtuously is 
the expectation of pleasure). Acting virtuously in order to experience its associated satisfaction 
would therefore not get one any closer to this satisfaction but would in fact get farther away with 
every attempt. Every pathologically motivated action is a step away from the virtuous disposition, 
which can only be acquired with practice and over time. There are therefore two main reasons 
why Kant’s conception of self-contentment is not vulnerable to Garve’s objection: 1) as a moral 
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pleasure, self-contentment simply does not arise if one’s motive is the expectation of pleasure, 
and 2) self-contentment does not arise from the performance of every virtuous action and thus 
cannot function as a motive in the way the expectation of pathological pleasure can. 
We have now seen how Kant’s understanding of self-contentment avoided Garve’s 
objection. It remains unclear, however, if self-contentment is just another word for what Kant 
calls moral pleasure, as has been suggested above, and whether this is how the term has been 
understood in the existing secondary literature. The rest of this paper will be devoted to 
answering these questions.  
 
3. Terminological Clarification 
 
 Self-contentment has been understood in various ways in the secondary literature. Lewis 
White Beck suggests that it and the positive side of respect are identical.4 Stephen Engstrom 
claims it is simply a different term for what Kant calls moral pleasure5, and others that it is in 
some way different without specifying precisely in what way.6 Kant’s concept of moral pleasure 
on its own at least leaves the question open of whether this is something one experiences after 
every performance of moral action. Given self-contentment is a kind of satisfaction one only 
experiences after already being motivated by the moral law alone, it is clear that self-
contentment is at least an instance of moral pleasure. Contrary to Engstrom, however, I think it is 
slightly inaccurate to say that self-contentment and moral pleasure are one and the same. Rather, 
moral pleasure is a general category or kind of pleasure, namely the kind that is consequent to 
rather than preceding the law, whereas self-contentment is an instance of this kind of pleasure. 
From what I have said above I think it is also clear that self-contentment is distinct from the 
positive side of respect. The positive side of respect is the admiration we have for the moral law 
in contrast to the pain and humiliation we experience by comparing ourselves to it, meaning it is 
something we can presumably experience often. Indeed, as the motive we ought to have when 
we act morally, respect is likely something we ought to feel every time we act, whereas, as stated 
above, self-contentment is not experienced this often, bur rather only after one possesses a 
virtuous disposition. It is also not the awareness of the moral law that produces self-contentment 
																																																								
4 See Beck, 229f. 
5 See Engstrom 2007, 144. 
6 See Packer 1989, 432, note 11. See also Johnson 2005 and Höwing 2013, 2. 
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directly, as is the case for the positive side of respect, rather it is the awareness that one has been 
the kind of person who has tried one’s absolute best to act morally over the course of one’s life. 
For these reasons I believe Beck and others are incorrect to suggest that self-contentment and the 
moral feeling of respect are identical. 
In conclusion, self-contentment is Kant’s concept of the intellectual satisfaction, 
analogous to but distinct from happiness, that human beings are capable of experiencing if we 
have lead a life trying our best to be moral individuals motivated by duty alone. I have argued 
that, as a kind of moral pleasure, the notion does not leave him vulnerable to objections like 
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